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Abstract 
 
With a share of almost 50 per cent in the EU's budget the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) is clearly the single most important EU policy. From its inception in the late 
1950ies it has also been its most controversial for being hugely protectionist and 
essentially command-and-control in nature (in the words of The Economist: “An 
expensive way to create surpluses, high food prices, environmental damage and harm to 
poor third-world farmers“). Neither intense international pressure nor several internal 
attempts to reform it (the CAP had triggered several severe budgetary crises in the EU), 
however, were successful so far. 
On May 1, 2004, eight central and eastern European countries (CEC-8) plus Cyprus and 
Malta, will join the EU; by 2008, Bulgaria and Romania are scheduled to follow. Their 
accession will present the CAP with its biggest challenge yet. While in the 15 current 
member states (EU-15) agriculture is a quantité négligeable (GNP share: 2.0 per cent; 
employment share: 4.3 per cent), it is of major economic importance to the newcomers 
(GNP share: 5.1. per cent; employment share: 21.4 (!) per cent). As a result, Eastern 
enlargement will create both a poorer and more agriculturally oriented EU. Against this 
backdrop we will estimate whether  Eastern enlargement is likely to increase the 
pressure for a fundamental CAP reform. 
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Will Eastern Enlargement Force the EU to 
Fundamentally Reform its 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)? 
 
Andreas Knorr* 
 
 
 
“…We give subsidies for a lot of reasons.  
                                                              The question is not do we give subsidies, 
     but how we give them” 
Franz Fischler (January 2003)1 
Introduction 
 
The outstanding political importance of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 
process of European integration can be observed when its share of the EU budget is 
considered – currently it accounts for 45 percent of EU’s expenditure; during the 
1980ies (Ardy 2000) its share even accounted for almost three quarters of the EU 
budget. Moreover, CAP’s share of the 80,000 page Acquis communautaire – the 
Union’s body of primary and secondary law – reached approximately 50 percent. 
Anyhow, regardless of some minor reforms CAP was not spared of fundamental 
economic criticism, firstly due to financing problems and secondly due to the reluctance 
of the EU to fully integrate agriculture into the GATT/WTO framework. The Economist 
(The Economist 2002) recently described the CAP as “an expensive way to create 
surpluses, high food prices, environmental damage and harm to poor third-world 
farmers”. However, European Union enlargement on 1 May 2004 poses a major chal-
lenge for the CAP. This is because agriculture has a far larger economic relevance in the 
new member states than in EU-15 (OECD 2002a and 2002b). The agricultural sector 
merely reaches a share of 2 percent of the gross national product (GNP) and 4.3 percent 
of employees in the current 15 EU member states (EU-15), whereas it reaches a 5.1 
percent share of GNP and 21.4 percent of employees in the European Union Acceding 
Countries (EUAC) in Eastern and Central Europe. Furthermore, the agricultural area 
will increase by 45 percent and the number of employees in the agricultural sector will 
even increase by 120 percent in the wake of this enlargement (European Commission 
2002a, 75) – with the EU’s overall population increasing by merely 28 percent and its 
GNP (calculated on the basis of purchasing power parities) by just 11 percent. This 
paper analyses the future prospects of the of CAP in the enlarged EU which, on average, 
will both be poorer and far more agriculturally oriented then the existing EU-15.   
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Basic Elements of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
Principles and Objectives 
The basic principles of CAP are the unity of the single market, i.e. free movement of 
goods within the EU, the joint financing (solidarity) and the so-called community 
preference, which directly led to the EU’s extreme protectionism in the agricultural 
sector. The precise design of the CAP, which has been introduced to the European 
Economic Community (EEC) – the EU’s economic pillar – from July 1964 onwards, is 
regulated in articles 32-38 (ex-articles 38-46) of the Treaty of Rome (as amended in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam). Article 33 (ex-article 39) mentions the following objectives : 
 To enhance agricultural productivity by encouraging technical progress, 
rationalisation in agricultural production and best possible input of production 
factors, in particular considering the workforce; 
 To guarantee the farming population an adequate standard of living, in particular by 
increasing income per head of farmers and other agricultural workers; 
 To stabilise (agricultural) markets; 
 To guarantee supply; and 
 To provide adequate prices for consumers. 
 
Instruments 
The aforementioned objectives were traditionally achieved by means of so-called 
common market organisations respectively market regulations against the background 
that most world prices of agricultural products are (substantially) lower than average 
production costs within the EU (Koester 1996). These regulations currently still include 
about 90 percent of the common agricultural production, strictly regulating their 
production and/or trade flows. Four basic types of market regulations can be 
distinguished (table 1). 
 
Table 1: Classification of CAP market regulations 
Type of market regulation Included products 
Intervention (=minimum prices) plus 
production subsidies plus protectionism 
Grain, milk and milk products (from 2005), beef, 
rice, olive oil, sheep meat, oil seeds, dried grapes 
Intervention plus protectionism Sugar, milk and milk products, pork, wine, fruit and vegetables 
Production subsidies plus protectionism 
Flax and hemp, fodder, processed produce of fruit 
and vegetables, tobacco, hops, seeds, goat meat, 
bananas 
Protectionism 
Poultry, eggs, other fats than olive oil, alive plants 
and goods of flower retailing, products, which do 
not fall in one of the other categories2 
Source: Based upon European Commission (2003a). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  These are basically substitutes for certain domestic products, which are cultivated outside the 
EU, e.g. manioc and soy.  
  
 
 
6
The functionality of the CAP’s agricultural support system is imaginably simple (table 2 
describes it for the grain market regulation). 
 
Table 2:   The traditional CAP price support mechanism (grain market 
regulation) 
Source: Bartling (1984, 34) and Swinbank (1996, 134). 
 
The target price, which is yearly set by the European Council of Agricultural Ministers, 
i.e. representatives of the member states, reflects the politically desired price level of the 
concerning product for the following year. The so-called threshold price for imports is 
calculated by subtracting transport costs between the main port of imports Rotterdam 
(Netherlands) and the principal intra-community subsidy area3 Duisburg (Germany) 
from the target price. The difference between this price and the world price, which is 
much more volatile than the former, is fully eliminated by a variable tariff, which is also 
known as absorption. A minimum price for agricultural imports is hence fixed by this 
procedure. This minimum price ensures that foreign producers are not in a position to 
offer their products in the EU below the EU’s target price. The intervention price marks 
a price floor for the affected agricultural products, which are produced within the EU, in 
case the degree of self-sufficiency of the community surpasses 100 percent. Farmers 
and distributors could initially sell their whole crop at this guaranteed minimum price 
per output unit at so-called intervention centers (in the meantime, some quota were 
introduced). The intervention price is calculated by adjusting the target price by the 
transport costs between the main area of surplus and the main area of subsidy. 
Therefore, the market price can only swing between the target price and the intervention 
                                                 
3  This means that any farmer in the Duisburg area is entitled to the highest subsidy amount per 
output unit throughout the entire EU. 
Target price 
Threshold price 
Intervention price 
World price
     Transport costs  
     Rotterdam-Duisburg 
 Absorption
 Export reimbursement 
Transport costs 
Orléans-Duisburg 
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price. Export subsidies (named export reimbursements) fully balance the difference 
between the higher production costs of the community and the lower world price in 
order to be able to sell at least part of the surplus production by exporting it to other 
states. 
 
The Economic Case Against the CAP 
The underlying problem of CAP – apart from the enormous and well-documented 
incentives to subsidy fraud inherent to the system (Angres, Hutter and Ribbe 1999) – is 
its almost sole orientation at the suppliers’ interest. By contrast, consumers, which are 
only mentioned once in the catalogue of the CAP’s objectives, are solely entitled to 
adequate – as opposed to low –prices for agricultural products (Messerlin 2001, 80). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that merely two of the four objectives could be achieved: 
security of supply and a sufficient income for employees of the agricultural sector. 
These apparent successes have been bought not only for a financially high price, as will 
be extensively argued below, since  the CAP still accounts for more than 50 percent of 
the EU’s budget. Furthermore, the huge  indirect costs of CAP have to be added to these 
direct costs – with most of the indirect costs having spilled over upon third countries. 
The economic critique of CAP substantially focuses on the four aspects which will be 
discussed now.      
 
Huge Welfare Losses Due to Autarky 
The politically intended autarky for important agricultural products had been achieved 
fairly rapid, partially already at the end of the 1960ies. Degrees of self-sufficiency of 
116 percent in case of grain, 98 percent in case of potatoes, 128 percent in case of sugar, 
109 percent in case of wine, 123 percent in case of milk (370 percent in case of milk 
powder), 103 percent in case of eggs and 107 percent in case of meat are reached at 
present according to official estimates (European Commission 2002b). The high 
necessary expenditures for the storage, elimination or the subsidized export of the 
resulting surpluses are not only the main cause behind the CAP-induced budgetary 
crises the EU has suffered regularly since its inception. Even worse, they also create 
considerable welfare losses due to the abdication of the welfare increasing effects of 
free(r) trade in agricultural products. The latter point does not just refer to the agricul-
tural sector itself, but also in all those sectors where the trade partners of the EU refused 
to agree to (further) liberalization due to the EU’s agricultural protectionism. 
Furthermore, the negative consequences (following overpriced inputs) for the 
competitiveness of the food processing industry within the EU and the below described 
substantial decrease in the consumer surplus also have to be added to the indirect costs 
of the CAP. 
 
Perverse Redistributional Effects 
With the help of the CAP politicians were very successful in redistributing income to 
the employees of the agriculture sector. In this regard it is not only remarkable that 
public net allowances, i.e. the balance of EU and member state grants minus all direct 
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taxes paid by the farming community, account for 47 percent of the income4 of 
agricultural employees in the EU-15 (European Commission 2001, 24). On a per capita 
basis, this translates into additional costs of approximately 370 Euros in terms of higher 
taxes and food prices for every EU-citizen and year – incidentally an especially serious 
strain on poorer household which spend a higher share of their income for food. But 
contrast, the household income of agricultural employees have – largely unnoticed by 
the public or even economists – continuously exceeded the average income of all house-
holds in almost all the EU’s member states (OECD 1999, 12; OECD 2002c, 12; OECD 
2003) – in the case of Belgium by a margin of approximately 25 percent, in Denmark 
and France5 by approximately 40 to 50 percent and in the Netherlands by more than 150 
(!) percent.6 Furthermore, these statistics conceal the fact that the major share of 
agricultural subsidies flows to the major agricultural producers (their proxies are also 
spearheading the national farmers’ unions of the EU member states), because the 
absolute output quantity still is the primary calculation base. This means that the Top 20 
percent of the agricultural businesses, which account for more than 70 percent of the 
common agricultural production, also receive nearly 80 percent of the subsidies granted 
by the EU and its member states, even though the income of their employees 
significantly lies above the average income of the sector and most notably above the 
average income of EU-citizens (The Scottish Parliament 2001, 6). Finally, CAP not 
only favours farmers to an extremely high degree, but also the owners of inputs, which 
cannot be easily replaced, in particular the lessors of land, which are in case of Germany 
in their majority neither active farmers nor residents of the rural areas nor in need of 
state aid for social policy reasons (Schrader 2000, 17; OECD 2002d).7 
 
CAP-induced Environmental Damages 
Like every other human activity agricultural production inescapably leads to 
environmental degradation. The principal areas for concern are the contamination of 
groundwater with fertilizers, pesticides and fungicides, the irrigation-induced 
salinization of land, erosion in case of extensive cultivation, pollutant emissions, the 
destruction of habitats, and, inseparably connected, a reduction of biodiversity. A 
considerable share of these damages can be ascribed to the already mentioned CAP-
immanent perverse incentives which foster overproduction in general. The problem is 
exacerbated by considerable state subsidies for important inputs (water, fertiliser, diesel, 
heat energy etc.), also encouraging environmentally damaging waste, so that they 
ultimately can be ascribed to political failure to a substantial degree (Stiftung Europäi-
sches Naturerbe EURONATUR, Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft 2002). 
Finally, indirect subsidies in the shape of price ceilings or laxer standards for pollutant 
                                                 
4  In this regard the EU speaks of a family farm business income.  
5  Messerlin (2001, 93) notes that France subsidised every employee in the agricultural sector with 
17,000 € in 1999 on average – the legal minimum wage in France is only 10,000 € per year.  
6  This is all the more noteworthy, because from the point of view of marginal farmers, the CAP’s 
subsidy regime ultimately acts as a market exit barrier, i.e. the CAP effectively decreases the 
average agricultural income! 
7  90 percent of the agricultural area in former East Germany are leased as compared to only 60 
percent in the West (Koester 2003, 154). 
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emissions of agricultural origin in comparison to standards for industry and private 
households are another crucial factor in this context (Knorr 1997, 47). 
 
Destabilisation of World Agricultural Markets and Trade Conflicts 
The EU and USA enjoy a world agricultural market share of about 20 percent each and, 
therefore, are the two biggest exporters of agricultural products. However, by adopting 
the CAP the EU transformed itself within a few years from a net importer to a net 
exporter (although the EU also is the world’s biggest importer of agricultural products 
with a world market share of 20 percent). Admittedly, the USA accounted for merely 
1.5 percent of export subsidies for agricultural products of the OECD member states 
between 1995 and 1998, but the EU accounted for 90.2 percent (Diakosavvas 2003, 46). 
This fact is considerably problematic insofar as the EU exerts considerable pressure on 
world market prices and, furthermore, ultimately externalizes a substantial share of the 
economic costs of the CAP; Borrel and Hubbard (2000) estimate that the EU shifts 
nearly a third of these on third countries. Moreover, the EU displaces competitive 
suppliers from third countries respectively considerably decreases their income, because 
re-imports of the highly subsidised surpluses fail to the greatest extent due to the EU’s 
comprehensive import restrictions. In addition, as the EU’s surpluses underlie signifi-
cant annual variations, which ultimately and inevitably lead to increased volatility of 
world market prices of agricultural products – this also implies negative allocative and 
redistributive impacts in the affected countries. Finally, CAP is the main cause of 
numerous trade political controversies and it also nearly caused the failure of the 
Uruguay Round.  
 
Previous CAP Reforms 
The aforementioned CAP-immanent problems became quickly manifest in high 
surpluses – the sufficiently well-known milk and wine lakes, butter and grain 
mountains, which were a logical consequence of achieving self-sufficiency from the late 
1960ies for most products. Initially the guaranteed minimum prices (without any 
limitation of the maximum allowable output per farmer per year) were the key cause for 
this development. These guaranteed prices also freed farmers of economic risks of any 
kind. In return the CAP quickly reached funding limitations in the face of a EU budget 
which is (currently) capped at 1.27 percent of the member states common GDP. Since 
CAP-induced expenditures increased six-fold in nominal terms and by more than 160 
percent in real terms between 1975 and 1988, the CAP gave rise to a significant 
budgetary crisis in the EU from the mid-1980ies (during the same period, the EU’s real 
GDP had increased by merely 32 percent and even agricultural production by only 25 
percent; Watzek 2001, 16). Instead of tackling the root of the problem, the economically 
flawed intervention and subsidy mechanism, the EU at first lapsed into a downright 
interventionist spiral by trying to fine-tune output through command-and-control means 
– an approach which was both economically counterproductive and ethically 
problematic (Schmitt 1998, 190; Howarth 2000, 8); for example: it was tried to correct 
the production surplus of milk by introducing slaughtering bonuses for calves (the so-
called Herodes-bonus). In 1977, after that initiative predictably  had remained widely 
unsuccessful, aside from – obviously – increasing supply on the beef market noticeably, 
a so-called co-responsibility fee was imposed on farmers. This meant that farmers from 
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now on did not receive the full intervention price per liter, but rather a rate which was 
curtailed by the joint-responsibility duty. Finally, production quota for milk were 
introduced as a temporary measure in 1984 after the preceding intervention also missed 
the desired effects. Anyhow, these quotas have been repeatedly prolonged (and are 
currently in force until 2005). 
In fact, with the help of later corrective measures the EU succeeded in reducing the 
share of CAP-expenditure of the EU’s budget, in particular due to the two reform 
packages of 1984 and 1988. Inter alia, they led to the reduction of intervention and 
guarantee prices, the introduction of a so-called guarantee threshold, a land set-aside 
and the decision to cap the share of CAP-expenditure of the EU’s budget to 0.71 
percent, later to 0.74 percent, of GDP-growth have to be mentioned. Nevertheless the 
surplus problem could not be fully solved up to now and the rise of the subsidy volume 
in absolute terms has continued (European Commission 2000, 32).  
The three most fundamental reforms, the so-called MacSharry reform of 1992, the 
Agenda 2000 and the recent decisions taken by the Council of Agricultural Ministers in 
late June 2003 in preparation of the enlargement process were also not capable of 
radically changing the aforementioned developments. However, these reforms changed 
the focus of the CAP from the traditional market intervention approach to a system of 
direct subsidies to individual farmers. The guarantee prices for the agricultural key 
products grain and beef had been further reduced in 1992, but all attempts of the then 
agricultural commissioner MacSharry and the European Commission to also implement 
similar reductions in case of milk, wine, fruit and vegetables failed due to the fierce re-
sistance of member states and the farmers’ lobby. Nevertheless, the direct bureaucratic 
control on production capacity has been substantially expanded at the same time. 
Moreover, farmers received full compensation payments for their income losses due to 
the reduction of the guarantee prices. These so-called direct payments (Swinbank 1996, 
137; European Commission 2003b), however are still in some way related to output fi-
gures, because they are calculated on the basis of historic average yields per acre and 
only farmers who really produce the product in question will receive them. As a result, 
the stated aim to uncouple agricultural (subsidy-)income and agricultural production has 
merely conditionally been reached, particularly since production-dependent subsidies of 
up to 25 respectively 40 percent are still allowed for some important agricultural 
products like grain and beef. Furthermore, member states agreed upon 
 a downright limitation of agricultural expenditure for the time between 2000 and 
2006 to 40.5 bn. € per annum and the introduction of a budget discipline 
mechanism, which shall prevent CAP-caused budgetary crises until 2013; 
 the reinvigoration of structural agriculture policy as the second pillar of CAP in 
order to support “rural development” by means of the so-called modulation 
approach, i.e. the (subsidised) creation of alternative jobs in e.g. landscape 
conversation, animal and environmental protection and tourism by support programs 
which are funded by reducing direct payments; and 
 the introduction of the so-called cross-compliance mechanism. It means that a 
farmer only receives full direct payments if he fulfils the legally required 
environment, animal protection and safety at work obligations; deductions of up to 
25 percent are possible in case of contempt.  
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Post-Enlargement Perspectives of the CAP 
 
The necessity of a fundamental reform of CAP, or better its total abolishment, has been 
extensively accounted for in this paper. This conclusion independently applies, if the 
EU will be enlarged by the EUAC or not. However, the MacSharry reform, the Agenda 
2000 and the recent reform decisions of the Council of Agricultural Ministers brought 
forward some innovations, which are in principal suited for correcting the most serious 
aberrations of the CAP, i.e. 
 the gradual change from direct market subsidies and price interventions to direct 
payments in 1992; 
 the introduction of modulation enables to end the grotesque system-immanent 
redistributions in favor of larger companies, which have not been revised by the 
change to direct payments and which cannot be justified in their current form on 
social policy grounds either; and 
 the attempts by the European Commission to draw member states on substantially 
co-financing CAP as it already has done in the case of the EU’s regional policy; all 
new member states will have to take part in co-financing direct payments within the 
first pillar of CAP immediately after joining the EU. Not only the group of the 
current net contributors to the EU’s budget, in particular Germany, would profit by 
this move. Furthermore, the new member states are above all not economically able 
to financially support farmers to the same degree as the richer current member 
states. This could possibly motivate both groups to form a coalition in order to reach 
the gradual abolition of the subsidy regime. 
 
However, the aforementioned scenario is not quite realistic, because experience teaches 
that the accession of more agriculturally-oriented poorer economies to the EEC/EU – 
Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986 – was always accompanied by a downright 
increase in agricultural expenditure (Field 1998). Furthermore, the weight of the 
agricultural lobbies has always gained importance in the process. This can be easily 
explained using rent-seeking theory, because the number of agricultural employees 
understates the real relevance of the farming community substantially. If family 
members, retirees, land owners and former farmers, which now work in other sectors, 
are added to the number of active employees the figure accords nearly one sixth of 
eligible voters in France, compared to just 4.4 percent of the employees who really 
work in the primary sector (Elliott and Heath 2000, 44). The comparative figure for the 
EUAC, in particular in Poland and Romania (which is likely to join the EU by 2008), is 
even higher, because of the still widely spread subsitence and semi-subsistence farming 
(proof of this is the existence of powerful farmers’ parties in some parliaments of the 
EUAC, in particular in Poland). Furthermore, the inevitable structural change in the new 
member states’ agricultural sector to larger units will reduce the organisational costs of 
the agricultural lobby and will, therefore, further increase its punch.  
Furthermore, the decision making modalities in the Council of Agricultural Ministers 
prove to be a first-rate institutional barrier to reform8, even though the relevant legal 
document – the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC-Treaty) ever since 
                                                 
8  Not to mention that farmers traditionally occupy the position of the agricultural minister and 
many other key positions of the public administration in nearly all current EU member states and 
in the EUAC. 
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provided for decision making by qualified majority in case of CAP. This policy is 
practised until today and favours the gainers of the status-quo – including the vast 
majority of the Eastern European farmers (and their relatives) – after enlargement.  
 
 
Conclusions and Outlook 
 
According to Koester (2000, 194), the development of the common agricultural policy 
of the EU impressively documents how difficult it is to change an institution once it has 
been created. While the EU’s Eastern enlargement did not, as many economists had 
predicted, fail because of insurmountable controversy about quotas for fruit, vegetables, 
sugar or grain, the historically unique opportunity to overcome the anachronism CAP, 
which can be considered as the last sector-specific centrally planned economy within 
the common market of the EU, has also been disgracefully ignored. Only massive 
pressure from other states could produce relief, in particular from EU trading partners 
on the basis of the WTO framework, the more so as article 20 of the WTO-agriculture 
accord explicitly calls for further liberalisation measures. So far, first indications are 
noticeable, as e.g. Argentina and Brazil have staged a complaint before the WTO 
against the EU-sugar market regulations – the most protectionist market regulation of 
common market organisation ever (Haupt 2003). Furthermore, the EU will have to offer 
compensation measures to its WTO-trade partners after the execution of enlargement, 
because the average import tariff for agricultural products levied by the EUAC is well 
lower than the tariffs of EU-15. The attempt to further liberalize agricultural markets in 
due time until March 2003 during the Doha Round failed due to opposition of the EU 
(and Switzerland), although the European Council – i.e. the heads of all the EU’s 
member states – unanimously approved the negotiation proposal of the European 
Commission in January 2003. This proposal envisaged the reduction of import tariffs by 
36 percent, a reduction of export subsidies by 45 percent and a reduction of 
competition-restraining internal agricultural support by 55 percent, inasmuch as the 
burden could be equally distributed between the developed countries (European Com-
mission 2003c). However, this proposal did not go to such lengths as the USA and the 
countries of the Cairns-group had expected. The suggestion for a compromise by WTO-
mediator Stuart Harbinson – reduction of agricultural tariffs by 60 percent and abolish-
ment of all export subsidies within 10 years – was dismissed by both sides: the EU 
thought of it as being far too radical and the USA and the countries of the Cairns-group 
wanted far further measures (Rademaker/Koch 2003). Therefore, the worst has to be 
feared, implying that the last promising opportunity in the foreseeable future for 
fundamental reform of CAP has again be missed. 
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